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“Animal Tracks in the Margin”: Tracing the 
Absent Referent in Marian Engel’s Bear  
and J. M. Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals
Paul Barrett
Abstract: This paper considers Carol Adams’ notion of the absent 
referent in Marian Engel’s Bear and J. M. Coetzee’s The Lives of 
Animals. I argue that both texts call for altered notions of reading 
and criticism that treat animals as presences but also contend with 
the difficulty of representing animals. Engel and Coetzee use dif-
ferent techniques to point to the impossibility of textual presence, 
in Adams’ sense, while also stressing the necessity of striving for a 
form of presence that represents animals beyond the logic of the 
absent referent.
Keywords: Coetzee, Engel, ecocriticism
­
In The Sexual Politics of Meat (1990) Carol Adams argues that 
animals have become absent referents, whose fate is trans-
muted into a metaphor for someone else’s existence or fate. 
Metaphorically, the absent referent can be anything whose 
original meaning is undercut as it is absorbed into a differ-
ent hierarchy of meaning; in this case the original meaning of 
animals’ fates is absorbed into a human-centered hierarchy. . . . 
The absent referent is both there and not there. (53)
Against this system of representation in which animals function as 
absent referents she proposes a method of critical reading based on a 
“vegetarian’s privileging of the literal” (117). In this practice meat loses 
its fungibility as a signifier and is reconnected to the literal death of ani-
ariel: a review of international english literature
Vol. 45 No. 3 Pages 123–149
Copyright © 2014 The Johns Hopkins University Press and the University of Calgary
124
Pau l  Ba r r e t t
mals. Adams’ call to return to the literal meaning of texts and represen-
tation is simultaneously compelling and puzzling. What, after all, is the 
“original meaning” of a subject both within and outside of discourse? 
How can critics claim to know the literal meaning of a sign? Does this 
claim to represent literal meaning occur from a place somehow beyond 
language and discourse? Is Adams guilty of what Michael Riffatere calls 
the “referential fallacy” (231), wherein the critic claims to bypass tex-
tuality and interpretation and access the extra-discursive object itself? 
As critics, what hermeneutical approaches might we use that pay heed 
to Adams’ privileging of the literal without abandoning the import of 
metaphor, metonymy, and the act of critical interpretation altogether? 
Adams’ theory of the absent referent, and the questions that dog 
her theory, inform my reading of Marian Engel’s Bear (1976) and J. 
M. Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals (2001). Both texts are concerned, 
in their form and content, with representing animals beyond the logic 
of the absent referent but are also skeptical about any claim to liter-
ality. Despite both texts’ struggle to represent animals, however, criti-
cal readings of the works reveal an unnerving consensus that interprets 
animals strictly as absent referents. Louis Tremaine, for instance, argues 
that “Coetzee’s personal interest in and respect for the conscious lives 
of animals are quite genuine, but the insight these passages hold for a 
reader of Coetzee’s novels bears more importantly on human experi-
ence, on the human condition of ‘embodiedness’” (598; emphasis in 
original). Marjorie Garber suggests that a central question for readers is 
“[w]hat . . . the emphasis on animals tell us about people” (75; emphasis 
in original). She notes that “we thought John Coetzee was talking about 
animals. Could it be, however, that all along he was really asking, ‘What 
is the value of literature?’” (84). Tremaine’s and Garber’s interpretations 
rely on the logic of the absent referent to argue that animals matter only 
insofar as they signify for humans. Michael Bell goes even further; he 
suggests the discussion of animal subjectivity in The Lives of Animals is 
“a Trojan horse designed to deconstruct the nature of conviction in rela-
tion to all fundamental life issues” (176). There is a virtual unanimity 
amongst critics that The Lives of Animals is not actually about animals 
but rather that the text’s discussion of animals must be a metaphor for 
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something else. Laura Wright is perhaps the only critic willing to ac-
knowledge that the text might truly be concerned with animals. She 
argues that “Coetzee’s text is on the one hand about our treatment of 
animals, both human and nonhuman, but it is also a rhetorical exercise 
of the sympathetic imagination and the role that imagining plays in 
breaking down binary distinctions” (212).
 Criticism of Bear reflects a similar consensus that disavows the pres-
ence of animals. Stacey Alaimo describes Bear as a text that disrupts 
“Enlightenment dualisms that have been complicit in the domination of 
nature, women and racially marked others” (155), a fine reading of the 
novel but one which effaces Bear’s presence completely. Patricia Monk’s 
Jungian reading of Bear argues that in her relationship with Bear, the 
novel’s protagonist, Lou, “encounters a feminine divinity in theriomor-
phic form—the bear-goddess Artio” (35) and that “Lou’s bear is .  .  . 
specifically a mother-image” (37). Elspeth Cameron contends that Lou’s 
“relationship with the bear is emblematic of her tentative exploration of, 
gradual immersion in, and full acceptance of the primitive forces in the 
world and herself ” (87). Coral Ann Howells stresses that the narrative 
is “about the relation between civilization and savage nature” (108) and 
explicitly marginalizes Bear, insisting that he is “the medium through 
which she [Lou] has been able to make her psychic journey through the 
wilderness” (116). Margery Fee’s argument that Lou uses Bear “as the 
kind of mirror that women have conventionally provided men: a surface 
onto which to project fantasy” (24) is certainly convincing but again 
analyzes Bear’s presence only in respect to his meaning for Lou. Whereas 
other critics see Bear strictly as a symbolic function of Lou’s challenge to 
patriarchy and assertion of her subjectivity, however, Fee is at least will-
ing to acknowledge the process by which Bear is subsumed within Lou’s 
metaphorical schema.1
I work against this critical legacy and argue instead that both Coetzee 
and Engel insist that animals signify in ways not always intelligible to 
humans and thematize the problems of writing and reading animals. 
Coetzee and Engel represent animals beyond the logic of the absent 
referent yet they are skeptical about their capacity to represent animals 
literally. Instead, their texts employ a number of strategies for writing 
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animals in a manner that is neither humanist nor claims to speak on 
behalf of animal subjects. Their formal choices address Lawrence Buell’s 
question of whether literary depictions of the environment and nature 
must necessarily “be taken as responding to nature, or as disguising 
a human interest.  .  .  . The answer to such questions is always ‘both’” 
(13). Buell describes this as the “dual accountability hypothesis” (102) 
wherein narrative offers an “ambidextrous response” (13) that 
avoids opposite reductionisms: reductionism at the level of 
formal representation, such as to compel us to believe either 
that the text replicates the object-world or that it creates an 
entirely distinct linguistic world; and reductionism at the ide-
ational level, such as to require us to believe that the environ-
ment ought to be considered either the major subject of con-
cern or merely a mystification of some other interest. (13)
Adams’ “privileging of the literal” engages in such a reduction and asserts 
that the “text replicates the object-world” and that its literal meaning 
can be unearthed by critics. I agree with Serpil Oppermann’s position 
that this “polemic about realist versus textualist views, which only helps 
generate just another version of duality that the environmental philoso-
phy successfully critiques, can be bypassed. In this respect the represen-
tations of nature in literature can neither be wholly dissociated from 
their referents in nature, nor from their complex conceptualizations in 
language” (120). In place of this privileging of the literal, which occurs 
at the expense of representational and critical practices, I argue, with 
Buell, Oppermann, and John Cooley, for an “ecological conception 
of textuality” (Cooley 252) that makes animals and the environment 
matter in representation rather than somehow beyond representation. 
Such a notion of textuality simultaneously attends to the gesture toward 
literal representation, the impossibility of that literality, and the struc-
turing of that impossibility within narrative as a representation of the 
human struggle to understand and relate to animal subjects and the 
environment. Bear and The Lives of Animals offer different modes of 
ecological textuality as they engage Oppermann’s question of “how the 
otherness of nature enters language as a non-speaking subject” (123) 
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while also writing animals as subjects unto themselves. Coetzee and 
Engel write animals into their texts in ways that render them present 
beyond a human structure of meaning while at the same time compli-
cating notions of presence in writing.
In The Lives of Animals, Coetzee presents his Tanner Lectures for the 
University Centre for Human Values at Princeton University in the 
form of fiction. Rather than deliver a traditional lecture, Coetzee read 
a fictional narrative about Elizabeth Costello, a novelist who has been 
invited to lecture at prestigious Appleton College. Instead of speaking 
on her designated topic, fiction, Costello delivers two lectures, “The 
Philosophers and the Animals” and “The Poets and the Animals.” The 
first lecture critiques the function of reason in devaluing animal subjec-
tivity and the second critiques representations of animals in poetry and 
fiction. Costello’s lecture within the narrative, which is within Coetzee’s 
own lecture, and their shared reticence in addressing eager academic 
audiences, tantalizingly suggests that Costello might “stand in” for 
Coetzee. Yet both the form of the narrative and the content of Costello’s 
lecture resist the interpretation of Costello as an absent referent for 
Coetzee. Indeed, from the outset of her lecture Costello is explicitly 
concerned with language and its capacity to represent others beyond the 
logic of the absent referent. She begins her talk by referring to a previ-
ous lecture on Kafka, “in particular to his story ‘Report to an Academy,’ 
about an educated ape, Red Peter, who stands before the members of a 
learned society telling the story of his life. . . . On that occasion I felt 
a little like Red Peter myself.  .  .  . Today that feeling is even stronger” 
(Coetzee 18). Costello’s lecture begins in a manner similar to Red Peter’s 
both in terms of her address to an academic audience and their shared 
confession of the impossibility of delivering the kind of lecture the audi-
ence desires. She insists that “the remark that I feel like Red Peter . . . 
I did not intend it ironically. It means what it says. I say what I mean” 
(18). Her invocation of Red Peter’s story returns to the question of the 
absent referent and Costello denies the “orthodox” (56) interpretation 
of Red Peter as an absent referent for Kafka’s alienation. The shift from 
“it” to “I” is one of the text’s earliest moments of narrative ambiguity. It 
is unclear precisely to whom “it” refers: Red Peter, Kafka, Kafka’s story, 
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or even Coetzee. Costello’s “literal cast of mind” leads her to offer a 
possible history of Red Peter’s capture, transfer to Europe, and gradual 
humanization, all based on her belief that “[w]hen Kafka writes about 
an ape, I take him to be talking in the first place about an ape” (32). 
Furthermore, her identification of Kafka as Red Peter’s “amanuensis” 
(26) suggests that Coetzee may occupy the same position in relation to 
Costello, thus further disrupting the logic of the absent referent.
Costello’s invocation of Red Peter’s lecture introduces the main 
theme of her Appleton College lectures: the impossibility of represent-
ing animal expression and subjectivity in literature. Indeed, throughout 
her first talk, she struggles to communicate what she means when she 
says “I feel like Red Peter.” Thus, when she appeals to her audience, 
explaining that she “want[s] to find a way of speaking to fellow human 
beings that will be cool rather than heated, philosophical rather than 
polemical, that will bring enlightenment rather than seeking to divide 
us” (22), she bespeaks the struggle for voice that animates her charac-
ter both within and outside her lecture. Costello’s struggle to speak as-
serts her own presence in the narrative and thematizes the struggle for a 
language that disrupts the absent referent. The language that she seeks 
is not a philosophical language that can distinguish “between mortal 
and immortal souls, or between rights and duties” (22) but rather an 
imaginative language that can communicate what it means to “feel like 
Red Peter.” Her alternative history of Red Peter does not necessarily 
insist that Red Peter actually existed as a talking ape but suggests that it 
is through narrative, story, and the powers of imagination that one can 
feel what it is like to be another body. She does not posit this history 
to challenge the historical record but rather to add to the narration of 
animal life in a manner that renders Red Peter present beyond the logic 
of the absent referent. It is thus through her interpretation of fiction 
and poetry that Costello is able to critique Thomas Nagel’s argument 
that a human can never know what it is to feel like a bat. She argues 
that “[t]o be a living bat is to be full of being; being fully a bat is like 
being fully human, which is also to be full of being. Bat-being in the 
first case, human-being in the second, maybe; but those are second-
ary considerations. To be full of being is to live as a body-soul” (33). 
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Costello maintains that imagination can represent and understand this 
“[f ]ullness of being” (33) in ways that philosophy and reason cannot. 
Fullness of being challenges the logic of the absent referent as it sug-
gests a model of subjectivity and representation in which subjects are 
present in their own right and can never be wholly effaced as part of 
some other subject’s meaning. Furthermore, Coetzee’s overarching nar-
rative aligns with Costello’s lecture as it challenges dominant forms of 
reason, expands notions of subjectivity, and practices a model of liter-
ary representation in which subjects are made present through an em-
bodied “[f ]ullness of being.”
Costello differentiates her conception of fullness of being from rea-
son-based arguments for humanist thought and silencing animal sub-
jects. As part of her critique of Descartes, Kant, Nagel, and others she 
argues that “reason may not be the being of the universe but on the 
contrary merely the being of the human brain” (23). She extends her 
argument by critiquing rationalist truisms that “the being of God is 
reason. . . . The universe is built upon reason. God is a God of reason 
. . . man is godlike, animals thinglike” (23). Costello suggests that dom-
inant forms of reasoning are a decidedly human means of understand-
ing the world and are merely the measures by which human subjects 
situate themselves in a central position in the human narrative of the 
universe. Her chain of equivalencies mocks the systems of logic and 
reason that transmute man into God and animal into thing. Costello 
critiques the “vast tautology” (25) between humanity and rationality: 
human beings are human because they possess reason and reason is the 
system of knowing particular to human experience. Her critique is made 
even more forcefully when she asks, “Might it not be that the phenom-
enon we are examining here is, rather than the flowering of a faculty 
that allows access to the secrets of the universe, the specialism of a rather 
narrow self-regenerating intellectual tradition whose forte is reasoning, 
in the same way that the forte of chess-players is playing chess”? (25). 
Foregrounding the implicit naturalism in the language of “flowering,” 
Costello suggests that humans locate reason “at the center of the uni-
verse” not because it is the discourse of the universe, or the natural posi-
tive quality of a “dominant species,” but because in placing reason as 
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central to any formation of the subject, humans provide themselves with 
an exclusive claim to full subjectivity. 
Costello’s critique of reason echoes the position of a number of eco-
feminist philosophers and critics, perhaps most closely that of Val 
Plumwood in Environmental Culture: The Ecological Crisis of Reason 
(2002). Plumwood argues that “[t]he ecological crisis we face . .  . [is] 
a crisis of the culture of reason or of what the dominant global cul-
ture has made of reason” (5). For Plumwood, Josephine Donovan, and 
others, many notions of animal rights fail to address the tautological 
relation between reason and the human subject such that animal rights 
theorists remain mired in an anthropocentric perspective. Donovan 
critiques the “subject-object mode inherent in the scientific epistemol-
ogy and the rationalist distancing practiced by the male animal rights 
theorists” (372). Plumwood offers a more nuanced critique of “[n]eo-
Cartesian animal defence theory” and submits that it is merely “an exer-
cise in boundary extension which otherwise retains the basic conceptual 
framework of Cartesian-rationalist monological relationships in which a 
rational-conscious mind confronts a mindless and morally meaningless 
universe” (143). She suggests that reason itself must be recovered from 
a humanist rationalism that constructs the environment and animals 
strictly as passive objects. This mode of rationalism “elevates to extreme 
supremacy a particular narrow form of reason and correspondingly de-
values the contrasted and reduced sphere of nature and embodiment” 
(4). It enables the absent referent by transforming animal subjects into 
objects that are easily stripped of their own meaning and located within 
a human-centric structure of meaning. Plumwood thus argues for new 
models of reasoning that are not anthropocentric but rather treat ani-
mals as subjects in their own right. Both Costello and Plumwood insist 
that “we need to seek out higher order forms of reason that can reflect 
critically on these failures and develop new forms” (Plumwood 18).
 In order to identify the failures of reason to account for all subjects, 
Costello draws a comparison between the mass slaughter of animals for 
food and the Holocaust. She argues that “[t]he particular horror of the 
camps . . . is that the killers refused to think themselves into the place of 
their victims. . . . In other words, they closed their hearts. The heart is 
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the seat of a faculty, sympathy, that allows us to share at times the being 
of another. Sympathy has everything to do with the subject and little to 
do with the object” (34–35; emphasis in original). Sympathy, accord-
ing to Costello, is a form of knowledge and experience better suited to 
understanding other subjects than is reason. Not only does Costello’s 
reference to the Holocaust allude to the monstrous way in which ration-
ality can violently convert subjects into objects, but her comparison of 
the slaughter of animals to the slaughter of Jews brings the problem 
of the absent referent to the forefront of her discussion of language, 
subjectivity, and reason. If one accepts that the Holocaust is that which 
defies comparison, an event that signifies such massive suffering that it 
simply cannot be abstracted in metaphor, Costello’s attempt to use it as 
a metaphorical referent for another subject’s pain inverts the typical ar-
rangement of the absent referent. Garber rightly suggests that Costello’s 
reference to the Holocaust asks that readers consider “the function of 
analogy in the posing of some of the most urgent ethical and political 
questions” (81). In this case the suffering of humans is made absent in 
order to illustrate the suffering of animals, an inversion that makes ex-
plicit the violence enacted by the absent referent.
In the text, Abraham Stern, a poet, protests Costello’s use of the 
Holocaust as a component of analogy and refuses to attend her second 
lecture. He explains:
You took over for your own purposes the familiar comparison 
between the murdered Jews of Europe and slaughtered cattle. 
The Jews died like cattle, therefore cattle die like Jews, you say. 
That is a trick with words which I will not accept. You misun-
derstand the nature of likeness. . . . Man is made in the likeness 
of God but God does not have the likeness of man. If Jews were 
treated like cattle, it does not follow that cattle are treated like 
Jews. (Coetzee 49–50)
Stern identifies the inherent misrepresentation in Costello’s “trick with 
words.” Yet perhaps Costello’s point is not to compare the treatment of 
cattle to the Nazis’ treatment of Jews but rather to highlight the innate 
misrepresentation in any use of the absent referent. Donna Haraway 
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makes a similar point to Stern’s; she makes the case that Costello, “[a]
rmed with a fierce commitment to sovereign reason . . . flinches at none 
of the discourse’s universal claims, and she embraces all its power to name 
extreme atrocity. She practices the enlightenment method of compara-
tive history in order to fix the awful equality of slaughter. Meat eating is 
like the Holocaust; meat eating is the Holocaust” (83). Haraway misses 
Costello’s sustained critique of “sovereign reason” and does not consider 
the possibility that Costello raises this “awful equality” in order to high-
light the violence inherent in such comparisons. Specifically, Costello 
seems especially interested in showing how this “familiar comparison” 
(a phrase that plays on the shared etymological origins of family and 
familiar) sustains a hierarchy that privileges humans at the expense of 
animals. 
 In place of the rationalism of the absent referent, Costello argues 
that subjects can “think themselves into the place of” some other sub-
ject through the power of the sympathetic imagination (Coetzee 34). 
She explains that “[t]here are no bounds to the sympathetic imagina-
tion. . . . If I can think my way into the existence of a being who has 
never existed, then I can think my way into the existence of a bat or a 
chimpanzee or an oyster” (35). According to Costello, humans can enter 
into animal experience and understand the “fullness of being” of animal 
subjects through the sympathetic imagination. Thus the narrative atten-
tion to “familiar comparison” gives way to an effort to think oneself into 
the place of an other. 
 Costello explicates her conception of the sympathetic imagination 
in her second lecture, “The Poets and the Animals,” particularly in her 
discussion of Rilke’s “The Panther” and Ted Hughes’ “The Jaguar.” She 
begins with a critique of the “kind of poetry” in which “animals stand 
in for human qualities: the lion for courage, the owl for wisdom, and so 
forth” (Coetzee 50) and argues that “in Rilke’s poem the panther is there 
as a stand-in for something else. He dissolves into a dance of energy 
around a center” (50). In both her discussion of the Holocaust and her 
reading of Rilke, Costello is concerned with “slaughtered” victims and 
“dissolve[d]” animals. Death pervades her discussion of the absent ref-
erent and she longs to find a method of representation that combats 
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this erasure. She locates an example of such a method in Hughes and 
states that he “is writing against Rilke” (50). Specifically, he is “feeling 
his way toward a different kind of being-in-the-world. . . . [W]e know 
the jaguar not from the way he seems but from the way he moves. The 
body is as the body moves. . . . The poems ask us to imagine our way 
into that way of moving, to inhabit that body. . . . With Hughes it is a 
matter—I emphasize—not of inhabiting another mind but of inhabit-
ing another body” (51). Hughes describes his encounter with the jaguar 
as “[b]y the bang of blood in the brain deaf the ear” and imagines the 
jaguar’s “stride is the wildernesses of freedom” (Hughes 12). Hughes’ 
impression of the jaguar is a mode of “poetry that does not try to find 
an idea in the animal, that is not about the animal, but is instead the 
record of an engagement with him” (Coetzee 51). His “bodying forth 
the jaguar” enables the reader to “embody animals—by a process called 
poetic invention that mingles breath and sense. . . . He shows us how 
to bring the living body into being within ourselves” (53). This is in 
line with Marc Bekoff’s argument that “deep ethology” requires that 
one “become coyote . . . become penguin . . . try to step into animals’ 
sensory and locomotor worlds to discover what it might be like to be 
a given individual, how they sense their surroundings, and how they 
behave and move about” (11). Costello suggests that poetry can employ 
the sympathetic imagination to represent that “primal .  .  . empathic 
connection” (Bekoff xxii) and depict embodied subjects in a manner 
that “mingles breath and sense.”
 Coetzee reflects this call in The Lives of Animals by interspersing 
Costello’s lectures with scenes of interpersonal relationships and by rep-
resenting the body in moments of sympathy and suffering. These inter-
ruptions bring Costello’s living body into being within the text while also 
enabling readers to think their way into her place. It is in this context 
that the narrative situates Costello’s concern with reason and animal suf-
fering within the turbulent familial relationship between Costello, her 
son John, and his wife Norma. Framing Costello’s lectures within these 
interpersonal relationships enables Coetzee to subtly demonstrate the 
fissures in human-centric rationalism as well as provide a voice that cri-
tiques her arguments. Indeed, the tension between the allegedly reasoned 
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debate of the lecture and the emotional undercurrents of Costello, John, 
and Norma’s relationships demonstrates how reason cannot be separated 
from emotion and desire. When Costello first enters Norma and John’s 
house, for instance, the narrator describes how “[h]ostilities are renewed 
almost at once” (Coetzee 16). Norma worries that Costello is trying to 
“undermine [her] behind [her] back” (68) and suggests that Costello’s 
vegetarianism, arguments against reason, and speaking engagement at 
the university where John teaches are all “nothing but a power-game” 
(68). Throughout the lecture Norma signals, via snorts and “a sigh of 
exasperation” (32), that she finds the topic ridiculous. Norma’s presence 
in the text at once predicts, and perhaps disarms, anticipated criticism of 
Coetzee’s lecture-text. Her insistence that “[t]here is no position outside 
reason where you can stand and lecture about reason” (48) attempts 
to critique Costello yet actually confirms her thesis that rationalism is 
a “vast tautology.” Furthermore, Norma’s relationships with John and 
Costello demonstrate that her insistence on strict reason remains em-
bodied and inextricable from emotions. For example, Norma insists 
to John that Costello’s views on “animal consciousness, and ethical re-
lations with animals are jejune and sentimental” (17). In his insight-
ful analysis of this passage, Robert McKay notes that jejune connotes 
“‘without food’ and hence ‘not intellectually nourishing’” and Norma’s 
use of the word links the discourse of reason with the consumption of 
subjects (11). The narrative juxtaposes Norma’s claim to universal reason 
and normalcy against Elizabeth’s attempts to develop and express a lan-
guage of sympathy and inter-subjectivity in order to demonstrate “how 
difficult it can be for morally serious people to sympathize with, or even 
understand, each other’s perspectives” (Gutmann 7). 
Norma’s criticisms are disarmed by Coetzee’s hybrid fictive mode, 
particularly as the text’s intertwining of reasoned debate with emotion 
and sympathy deconstructs what Lori Gruen identifies as an “unneces-
sary dichotomy between reason and emotion” (79). Norma refuses to 
recognize an intellectual position outside of reason and her staunch 
rationalism supports John’s observation that he does not “think she is 
in a position to sympathize” (Coetzee 68). Cathryn Bailey anticipates 
Norma’s argument and Coetzee’s project more generally, arguing that 
135
“An ima l  Tr a ck s  i n  t h e  Marg in”
“[t]o continue to treat emotion and reason as elements that can and 
should be distinguished in the process of moral philosophy ignores the 
fact that reason and emotion are intertwined in ways that are not always 
obvious” (13). Norma and Elizabeth’s relationship demonstrates that 
reason is always an embodied discourse; it is always a manifestation of 
an embodied subject at a specific moment within a particular context. 
In demonstrating the extent to which Norma’s conflict with Elizabeth 
is founded on emotion and a lack of sympathy but manifests itself in a 
debate about the merits and limits of reason itself, the narrative dem-
onstrates how reason is always embodied, always contextual, and never 
wholly isolated from emotion.
 The narrative also critiques rationalism and echoes Costello’s call for 
sympathy between subjects in its attention to her body. The first descrip-
tion of Costello is given from John’s perspective. He notices that “her 
hair . . . is now entirely white; her shoulders stoop; her flesh has grown 
flabby” (Coetzee 15) and thinks of her as “this fleshy, white haired lady” 
(16). This representation of Costello as distinctly embodied—and par-
ticularly vulnerable in her embodiment—evokes her argument that 
against “thinking, cogitation, I oppose fullness, embodiedness, the sen-
sation of being—not a consciousness of yourself as a kind of ghostly 
reasoning machine thinking thoughts, but on the contrary the sensation 
– a heavily affective sensation – of being a body with limbs that have 
extension in space” (33). Representing the embodied subject displaces 
discourses of subjectivity and reason from the abstract-universal and 
instead locates them within a particular, lived, embodied experience. 
Thus, at the end of the narrative, John responds to Elizabeth’s “tearful 
face” by taking “his mother in his arms. He inhales the smell of cold 
cream, of old flesh. ‘There, there,’ he whispers in her ear. ‘There, there. It 
will soon be over’” (69). Costello weeps for the animal suffering that she 
cannot ignore, the seeming indifference of those around her to the suf-
fering, and the impossibility of any meaningful course of action to pre-
vent it. John’s final words, the final words of the text, are inflected by his 
awareness of “the smell of cold cream” and “old flesh” to indicate how 
his comfort is shadowed by his indifference to Costello’s vulnerability 
and death. There is a trace of hollowness in John’s final words and thus 
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while he appears to sympathize he also appears to pander to Elizabeth 
in a manner that suggests his inability to feel himself into Elizabeth’s 
place. John’s denial of his own body, his presence as a “dance of energy 
around a center” (50),2 limits his capacity to sympathize and understand 
Costello as an embodied subject. However, Costello’s embodied pres-
ence within the text invites readers to employ their own imaginations 
and feel their way into Elizabeth’s position in ways that John’s hollow 
words cannot.
In addition to stressing Costello’s vulnerability and providing an 
instance of the sympathetic imagination, the narrative’s attention to 
Costello’s embodiedness also questions the extent to which Costello 
is an absent referent for Coetzee. The overlap between Costello and 
Coetzee is very difficult to determine as the narrative’s multiple layers 
of focalization and hybrid form (as both lecture and fiction, oral and 
written) make the spaces between subjects as well as the borders be-
tween the inside and outside of the narrative virtually impossible to 
determine. Perhaps the first level of focalization occurs with Coetzee 
reading the narrative to his audience during the lecture. Within that 
narrative is a narrative voice that is distinct from any of the characters. 
From there the narrative is focalized on John who observes his mother 
as she lectures.3 McKay argues that the problem of authorial intent is 
further problematized not only by the hybrid narrative form, but also 
because “the author is physically there” to deliver the narrative (14; em-
phasis in original). With Coetzee speaking as an embodied, physical 
presence, the distinction between him and Costello becomes unclear 
and the reader or listener is never sure where Costello’s and Coetzee’s 
respective lectures intersect. Yet Costello’s embodiedness and the sym-
pathy that she evokes cuts through these layers of focalization, render-
ing her a subject who “mingles breath and sense” and is present in her 
own right. 
Costello’s embodiedness within the narrative also demonstrates the 
manner in which such a presence resists a clear exchange of subjects 
via the absent referent. Coetzee cannot simply map his own authorial 
presence onto Costello as her embodied being resists being subsumed 
into the logic of the absent referent. Instead, her embodied subjectiv-
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ity expresses an existence independent of the author despite Coetzee’s 
physical presence when delivering the lecture. The single passage in 
which Norma’s body is described occurs in this context: “In a show of 
affection that must cost her a great deal, Norma holds her arms out 
wide and says, ‘Elizabeth!’” (Coetzee 15). This sole moment of Norma’s 
embodiment, in which she holds her arms open to embrace an other, 
is also an instance of affection “that must cost her a great deal.” In this 
moment of physical presence Norma moves outside the sphere of reason 
and enters into a model of embodied, sympathetic intersubjectivity. 
The language of cost connotes the exchange at the heart of this sympa-
thetic act as well as Norma’s displacement from an economy of cleanly 
exchangeable signs that comes with her act of physical embrace. That 
Norma has a PhD in Philosophy of Mind further indicates the price of 
Norma’s embodiment, particularly as she abandons the self as the priv-
ileged, rational subject confronting a mindless world of objects. Indeed, 
it is in this sense of the cost of the body as it disrupts the economy of 
signs that the Dean of Appleton College describes vegetarianism as a 
“very odd transaction” (44). 
This economy is critical to the logic of the absent referent. When sub-
jects are imagined strictly as “ghostly reasoning machine[s]” (33) bereft 
of physicality, they are easily abstracted in order to fit the structure of 
the absent referent. Plumwood argues that this system of purely sym-
bolic exchange results in “distorted forms of human rationality whose 
simple, abstract rules of equivalence and replaceability do not fit the 
real, infinitely complex world of flesh and blood, root and web on which 
they are so ruthlessly imposed” (14). Bodily presence disrupts a ration-
alist economy of signs and makes this clean exchange impossible. Cary 
Wolfe contends that “the full transcendence of the ‘human’ requires the 
sacrifice of the ‘animal’ and the animalistic, which in turn makes pos-
sible a symbolic economy in which we can engage in a ‘non-criminal 
putting to death’” (39). Wolfe’s argument, while beyond the scope of 
this essay, suggests that the representation of the body within symbolic 
systems problematizes the economy of signs and the transcendence of 
the human subject as the body renders the subject vulnerable, particular, 
and present and non-equivalent with other subjects. The narrative atten-
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tion paid to Costello’s body is thus a crucial component of Coetzee’s 
environmental cultural project, particularly as it disrupts the structure 
of the absent referent, refuses the “sacrificing of the animal,” and ren-
ders subjects present within the text. In bringing the body into being 
within his text, Coetzee mixes the physical, emotional, and reasoning 
components of subjectivity which, in combination with his ambigu-
ous focalization, undermines the economy of signs in which the absent 
referent functions. 
 Engel’s Bear engages in a number of the textual practices that Costello 
calls for in her lectures and that Coetzee practices throughout The Lives 
of Animals. Bear is a less philosophical and experimental novel but it is 
equally attuned to the challenges of writing animals within narrative 
and offers different formal methods for attending to both the desire 
for literal representation and the final impossibility of literality. Bear 
addresses what Barbara Smuts identifies as a “striking gap” in Coetzee’s 
text, namely the “the lack of reference to real-life relations with animals” 
(108),4 yet does so in a manner that keeps the difficulty of representing 
animals in fiction at the forefront of that representation. Smuts agrees 
with Costello’s call for embodied sympathy but “would phrase her point 
slightly differently, so that it has less to do with the poetic imagination 
and more to do with real-life encounters with other animals” (120). In 
Bear, Costello’s arguments concerning the continuity between reason 
and emotion, the value of the sympathetic imagination, and the role 
of the body in disrupting the absent referent are thematized in a re-
lationship between a woman and a bear. The novel begins as Lou, an 
academic working at an “Historical Institute” (Engel 11), moves to 
northern Ontario to collect and research the historical papers of the de-
ceased Colonel Cary. Lou begins her project by attempting to assemble 
Cary’s historical details by ordering, filing, and interpreting his papers 
and notes. Her efforts to render history present eventually give way to 
her increasing interest in the bear that resides on Cary’s estate. Over the 
course of the summer Lou develops an emotional, spiritual, and sexual 
relationship with the bear. As the novel proceeds, she is progressively 
distracted from her textual-historical project and more focused on the 
bear and his presence in her life.
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The structure of the absent referent is present from the very begin-
ning of the text where Lou is described as spending her winters living 
“like a mole” that “would not be forced to admit it had been intended 
for an antelope” (11, 12). Animals are present throughout Bear and are 
routinely constructed as absent referents that operate as metaphors for 
Lou’s experience. “So this was her kingdom,” she thinks when she arrives 
on the island; “the idea of a bear struck her as joyfully Elizabethan and 
exotic” (29). She enters “the forest solemnly, as if she were trespassing 
in a foreign church” (47). The absent referent pervades the first half of 
the text as Lou ascribes meaning to both the environment and Bear ac-
cording to what each signifies for her. The absent referent is also present 
in the text’s continual references to colonial literature; for example, Lou 
imagines herself as “Cary advancing boldly on the new world, Arala 
under one arm, Oroonoko and the handbooks of capability brown under 
the other” (52). In these passages, and in her confession that “[e]very-
one wants to be Robinson Crusoe” (42), Lou affirms that “this was her 
kingdom” and that the bear and the environment matter only insofar as 
they fit her schema of representation.
Bear comes to stand in for an alternative to the violence of misogyny 
and patriarchy that Lou experienced in the city as well as an escape 
from her personal insecurities and anxieties. She constructs Bear as a 
mythic, transformative, and magical creature that provides her with a 
sense of meaning and hope and alleviates her “crises of faith” and uncer-
tainty about “why she did what she did for a living. And who she was” 
(84). Upon arriving on the island, Lou describes “an odd sense of being 
reborn” (19), and in one particularly telling passage, after she and Bear 
have begun their sexual relationship, Lou pleads with him to “take me 
to the bottom of the ocean with you, bear, swim with me, bear put your 
arms around me, enclose me, swing, down, down, down with me. Bear 
make me comfortable in the world at last. Give me your skin. . . . What 
I want is for you to continue to be something to me. No more. Bear” 
(112–13). Her stream-of-consciousness appeal signifies the dissolution 
of her past self, yet Bear remains an object upon which she projects her 
desires. Lou repeatedly demands that Bear make her “comfortable in the 
world at last” and that he “continue to be something to” her. 
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Upon meeting Bear Lou is confronted with the incongruity between 
her idea of Bear and the actual Bear on the island. The narrator explains 
that “it had seemed a wonderfully strange idea at first, but it appeared 
there really was a bear” (31). After her first encounter with Bear, she 
realizes that “[e]veryone has once in his life to decide whether he is a 
Platonist or not. . . . I am a woman sitting on a stoop eating. . . . This 
is a bear. Not a toy bear, not a Pooh bear, not an airlines Koala bear. A 
real bear” (34). Lou’s shift in perception disrupts the absent referent, as 
Bear is an embodied subject within the text. Bear’s physical presence 
at this early stage in the novel unsettles the rationalism that privileges 
forms and abstractions over embodied, particular subjects. Yet Lou still 
attempts, throughout the text, to map various meanings and identities 
onto Bear. She imagines him as “a middle-aged woman” (36), “a lump” 
(34), and “a cross between a king and a woodchuck” (55). She describes 
how Bear “stood there staring at [her] like a fur coat” (47) and how he 
sits “in the water like a large-hipped woman” (69). She watches him sit-
ting in her bedroom, “solid as a sofa, domestic, a rug of a bear” (70). It 
is in this sense of the multiple personas, images, and likenesses that Lou 
maps onto Bear that the narrator explains that “she could paint any face 
on him that she wanted, while his actual range of expression was a mys-
tery” (72). At this stage in the text Bear is always marked by an absence, 
always described through analogy, simile, and metaphor, and is repeat-
edly perceived as a quasi-object (Latour). The contradictory quality of 
being a subject that is at once “a fur coat” but still stares, or of being 
“strange, fat mesomorphic manikin” (Engel 113) inscribes the unknow-
able dimension of Bear’s subjectivity within the text. Lou’s approxima-
tions and descriptions of Bear as a strange object-subject indicate his 
enigmatic quality and the failure of Lou’s language to fully account for 
his animal presence.
Bear’s status as an absent referent in the text changes, however, when 
Lou attempts to consummate her relationship with him. As she reaches 
for his penis, on “all fours in front of him, in the animal posture” 
(131), Bear “reached out with one great paw and ripped the skin on 
her back” (131). In this moment Bear defies the logic of the absent 
referent and declares himself a subject within the narrative. This pain-
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ful physical contact forces Lou to realize that Bear is not a mythical 
symbol of her rebirth but a living, physically present bear. She does 
not attempt to construct a narrative around her wound, but reads it 
literally as a wound from a bear: “What had passed to her from him she 
did not know. Certainly it was not the seed of heroes, or magic, or any 
astounding virtue. But for one strange, sharp moment she could feel 
in her pores and the taste of her own mouth that she knew what the 
world was for” (137). Lou abandons the notion that Bear is somehow 
a conveyer of mystical, primordial knowledge or a mythological figure, 
yet she still experiences something of a revelation in this moment of 
sexuality and violence. This is the moment of textual interruption that 
Adams describes as “the gestalt shift . . . [that] occurs when the move-
ment of the novel is suddenly arrested” (148) and the subject of the 
absent referent “breaks into the text” (149). Paradoxically, Lou’s use of 
metaphor and metonymy enables her to first know Bear, yet she sup-
plements this figurative understanding with her newfound awareness 
of both Bear and herself as embodied presences. In “bodying forth” 
Bear (Coetzee 53), the narrative disrupts the logic of the absent refer-
ent through an “empathic connection” (Bekoff xxii) based on a “poetic 
invention that mingles breath and sense” (Coetzee 53). This moment 
of wounding both pronounces Bear as an embodied presence within 
the text and also invokes Lou’s own sense of her body, awakening her 
within her own physicality. Lou goes from having “arms [that] were 
slug-pale and . . . fingerprints grained with old, old ink” (Engel 12) to 
an embodied capacity to “feel in her pores and the taste of her mouth 
that she knew what the world was for” (137). The image of her body at 
the beginning of the text, “as old as the yellowed papers she spent her 
days unfolding” (19), connects her disembodiment and bodily torpor 
with textual representations that deny the presence of the body. Lou 
moves out of this disembodied mode of existence to gain access to a 
form of knowledge similar to what Costello describes as “the flow of 
joy that comes from living not in or as a body but simply from being 
an embodied being” (Coetzee 34; emphasis in original). Lou’s experi-
ence with Bear brings her into a new embodied awareness of being that 
“mingles breath and sense,” and her embodiedness enables her to rec-
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ognize Bear as a subject in his own right rather than an absent referent 
for her meaning.5 
 Bear’s presence, Lou’s repeated use of the absent referent throughout 
the narrative, and the text’s explicit references to representations of ani-
mals all indicate the novel’s central concern with the problem of repre-
senting animals in literature. Bear, much like The Lives of Animals, both 
critiques the literary methods that render animals as absent referents 
while employing a form that disrupts the logic of the absent referent. 
Lou recalls that “[s]he had read many books about animals as a child. 
Grown up on the merry mewlings of Beatrix Potter.  .  .  . Yet she had 
no feeling at all that either the writers or the purchasers of these books 
knew what animals were about” (Engel 60). She also remembers “the 
animal tracks in the margin” of novels she read as a child and wonders 
whether “a life that can now be considered an absence” is truly a life (59, 
19). She refers to both her own marginalized existence as well as Engel’s 
broader textual project of recovering the “absent life” from the margins 
of subjectivity and textuality. Specifically, the text raises the question 
of whether Bear’s presence is always marginal, merely a mirror upon 
which Lou projects her own image, or if Bear is present in a manner 
that challenges the marginality of animal subjects. Descriptions of Bear 
alternate between “he” and “it,” and Bear is described as both “the bear” 
and “Bear”. In numerous passages the narrative voice is ambiguous; it is 
unclear whether Lou or the narrator describes Bear. Does the narrative 
actually represent Bear’s feeling or is this Lou’s anthropomorphizing? 
Is it Lou or the narrator who claims “she could paint any face on him 
that she wanted, while his actual range of expression was a mystery” 
(72)? Whereas Coetzee uses complicated levels of focalization to throw 
the subject into question, Engel instead uses a narrative mode in which 
speaking subjects are ambiguous to the extent that Lou’s perspective, the 
narrator’s perspective, and possibly even Bear’s perspective can never be 
wholly isolated. 
Like Coetzee’s use of focalization, Engel’s deployment of ambiguous 
perspective is a narrative technique for inscribing animals into narra-
tive without claiming to speak for them or represent them literally. This 
method evokes Costello’s statement that she has “a literal cast of mind” 
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that paradoxically employs the figurative trope of the cast to make her 
claim about literality. Literality is, therefore, always evasive: simultan-
eously desirable and impossible. In place of literality, Coetzee and Engel 
render subjects present in narrative through the faculties of sympathy 
and the representation of the body, but that presence is always shadowed 
by its own impossibility. Wright argues that Coetzee’s narrative form 
suggests an alternative to the strict logic of reason and that the ambigu-
ity of speaking subjects “establishes a third and perhaps more sentimen-
tal place from which to write against the primary binary opposition of 
the animal/human” (197). She writes: 
[T]he performative voice that Coetzee inhabits when he speaks 
Elizabeth Costello, . . . is neither Coetzee’s nor Costello’s, nei-
ther male nor female, neither fully rational nor emotional. This 
is the voice that not only problematizes the dichotomous logic 
responsible for the binary oppositions of colonial and patriar-
chal thought, including the animal / human dualism, but that 
also disrupts the privileging of the rational over the emotional 
by calling into question assumptions about author, narrator, 
protagonist, text, and audience. (200)
Both Coetzee and Engel develop an ambiguous narrative voice that un-
dermines categories of author, narrator, protagonist, and text as well as 
the relationship between subjects more generally. Engel’s textual mode 
enables her to inscribe Bear as an unknowable presence within the novel: 
he is present but the extent to which the reader is able to access “Bear” 
independent of Lou or the narrator’s construction of him is unclear. This 
uncertainty about Bear’s presence transforms the impossibility of a full 
representation of animals within narrative into a principle of narrative 
structure. 
 These narrative forms contribute to what Plumwood identifies as 
the “kinds of imaginative literature which write nature as agent, re-
subjectivising and re-intentionalising the non-human as an ethical and 
intentional subject of narrative” (54). In their attention to notions of 
sympathy, critique of dominant forms of reason, insistence on writing 
the body, and ambiguous narrative voice and focalization, both Engel 
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and Coetzee call on readers to rethink the relationship between human, 
animal, and environment as one between subjects. Yet they also insist on 
the impossibility of Adams’ “privileging of the literal” (117) and instead 
transform the impossibility of literality and the continuing interplay 
between presence and absence into a formal element of their “ecologi-
cal conception of textuality.” Their formal choices are akin to Margot 
Norris’ conception of biocentric textuality, which she describes as “[t]
he task of finding a language and voice for that animal and its interior 
life” (224), which typically employs “the Derridean antimetaphysical 
concepts of the trace” (21).6 In the texts that Norris examines, however, 
the effort to find a voice for the animal is always subservient to “the 
biocentric agenda of reappropriating the animal in the human” (225). 
Coetzee’s and Engel’s environmental cultural texts are instead concerned 
not with appropriating the animal in the human but with establishing 
Wright’s “third place” from which they represent the animal in narrative 
while simultaneously transforming the impossibility of writing animals 
into a principle of narrative form. 
Coetzee’s and Engel’s ambiguous narrative voices, complex focaliza-
tion, and attention to the body and the sympathetic imagination work 
against “reductionism at the level of formal representation” as well as “at 
the ideational level” (Buell 13). Both authors call on readers to offer an 
“ambidextrous response” (Buell 13) that is attuned to the impossibility 
of speaking for animals but recognizes that impossibility as a necessary 
condition of trying to read and know animals in literature. It is in this 
sense that they differentiate themselves from Adams’ general distrust of 
metaphor, particularly when she asks, “Could metaphor itself be the 
undergarment to the garb of oppression?” (46). Coetzee and Engel do 
not deny the efficacy and power of metaphor; nor do they join Adams 
in her “vegetarian privileging of the literal.” Instead they employ meta-
phors (as in Costello’s “literal cast of mind”) in which the relationship 
between tenor and vehicle is in constant flux. Lou’s use of tropes enables 
her to know Bear in her own human-centric schema of understanding. 
However, it is only when she recognizes that “[w]hat had passed to her 
from him she did not know” (Engel 137) that she complicates the tropes 
and learns to view the unknowable aspects of Bear’s presence as part of 
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her understanding of him. Coetzee’s complicated layers of focalization 
and Engel’s ambiguous perspectives undo the logic of the absent refer-
ent without abandoning figurative and imaginative writing altogether. 
Instead, readers must engage in an “ambidextrous response” that retains 
both the literal and figurative meanings of metaphor simultaneously in 
view and under erasure. As Bekoff notes, “[b]y engaging in anthropo-
morphism we make other animals’ worlds accessible to ourselves and to 
other human beings. By being anthropomorphic we can more readily 
understand and explain the emotions or feelings of other animals” (48). 
Bekoff, Coetzee, and Engel agree that some degree of anthropomor-
phism is unavoidable if one is to depict animals in imaginative writing. 
Therefore, Coetzee and Engel strive to keep their own anthropomorphic 
gestures in view in order to neither reduce the animal to an absent refer-
ent nor surrender the animal to absolute unknowable otherness. 
Coetzee’s and Engel’s attention to acts of reading and literary inter-
pretation also call on critics to develop new methods of interpreting ani-
mals in narrative that neither strive for literality nor reduce animals to 
absent referents. Both Costello’s position as a novelist speaking at a uni-
versity and Lou’s academic profession indicate that the authors’ critiques 
are partially directed at scholars. Graham Huggan affirms that “[t]he 
simulated form of the lectures allows Coetzee to reflect ironically on the 
gap between ivory-tower academicism and real-world social practice” 
(710). Engel engages a similar critique in her narrative’s parody of the 
“whirl of scholars [that] whizzed from fact to fact, all of them weeding 
and verifying” (56). Weeding suggests the manner in which scholarship 
marginalizes elements of narrative, pruning and removing the seemingly 
unimportant or problematic aspects.7 Literary criticism which does not 
engage environmental cultural texts with a “fullness of being” or that 
does not allow space for literality works against the logic of such texts 
and reifies categories of reason and subjectivity.
A criticism that embraces Plumwood’s call for environmental cul-
ture would read these narratives against the logic of the absent referent, 
where subjects do not necessarily stand in as signifying objects for some 
broader textual meaning but are instead present in and of themselves. 
This would be a critical language that engages texts in a way that “min-
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gles breath and sense” and “bring[s] the living body to being within 
ourselves” (Coetzee 53). This mode of criticism would give due atten-
tion to the literal meaning of narrative in addition to possible figura-
tive or implied meanings. Animals are not a periphery component of 
these texts but are every bit as central to the narrative as any question of 
form, subjectivity, reason, or affective knowledge. Bear is not just a text 
about expanding concepts of knowing or finding an alternative to ab-
stract reason in embodied being: it is also a text about a bear. Similarly, 
Coetzee’s text and Costello’s lecture are both about animals. A mode 
of analysis that embraces embodied, sympathetic subjectivity must 
recognize the potential for misrepresentation and violence inherent in 
metaphor and critical methods must be developed which question the 
logic of the absent referent in both texts and criticism. At the very least 
some scholarly attention must be paid to the literal meaning of these 
texts, particularly as the impossibility of literality produces a unique 
form of presence unto itself. Furthermore, this ecocritical practice must 
also indicate the unique capacities of fiction and poetry to enliven the 
“sympathetic imagination” and offer forms of critical anthropomorph-
ism that represent animal subjects in ways that plain prose and scientific 
accounts cannot. Yet Bear and The Lives of Animals do not only gesture 
toward a new mode of critical analysis just as they do not merely argue 
for expanded modes of subjectivity and reason. These texts are about 
animals and animals must be located at the centre of the narratives in 
any ecocritical analysis. Coetzee and Engel discuss the problem of de-
scribing animals, but they also discuss animals themselves, and this final 
point is key to any critical response that takes seriously the challenge of 
developing environmental culture. 
Notes
 1 For additional criticism on these works, see McKay and Turcotte (1995). 
 2 Costello uses this phrase to describe Rilke’s Panther and points out that it is “an 
image that comes from physics” (50). John’s career as a physics professor and his 
position as the central focalizing point in the narrative who is simultaneously 
present while also absent as a subject unto himself make this a fitting description 
of John’s place in the narrative.
147
“An ima l  Tr a ck s  i n  t h e  Marg in”
 3 While the similarities between Coetzee and Costello are clear, the given name 
shared by Coetzee and John Bernard also implies an affiliation between Coetzee 
and Elizabeth’s son.
 4 It is not, strictly speaking, accurate to claim that The Lives of Animals contains 
no “reference to real-life relations with animals.” Costello’s multiple references 
to animals are, however, always interpreted through the framework of narrative 
rather than immediate experience. This at once circumvents the difficulty of 
writing animals directly into the narrative while also echoing Costello’s point 
that it is through narrative, poetry, and the sympathetic imagination that one 
can come to know and understand animal beings. 
 5 The wound that Bear leaves on Lou’s back can be read as a metonymic marking 
of his movement into embodied subjectivity. The wound is a bodily sign of the 
vulnerability of the subject that calls on an other to sympathize. The wound is 
also, however, a sign of the very limits of signification, a failed signifier of the 
expression of pain and subjectivity that exist beyond symbolization. It is in this 
context that Costello, during her lecture, describes herself as “not a philosopher 
of mind but an animal exhibiting yet not exhibiting, to a gathering of scholars, a 
wound, which I cover up under my clothes but touch on in every word I speak” 
(Coetzee 26). The image of this wound that she touches “on in every word [she] 
speak[s]” recalls her “literal cast of mind” and connects her embodied subjectiv-
ity with the pain and vulnerability that emerge from her language of sympathy.
 6 Norris’ conception of biocentric textuality treats representations of animals and 
animality as “the masks of the human animals who create them” and focuses on 
the “human being as a cultural creature, as implicated in the Symbolic Order” 
(3). Her interpretation of Kafka, Lawrence, and others is concerned with identi-
fying the manner in which these authors appropriate the animal as metaphor for 
the biocentric subject and as a rebuke of mimesis and idealism. Biocentric tex-
tuality is distinct from an ecological textuality as these texts are marked by “the 
invention of artistic and philosophical strategies that would allow the animal, 
the unconscious, the instincts, the body, to speak again in their work” (5). Yet 
in her reading, “the animal” is contiguous with “the unconscious, the instincts, 
[and] the body” such that animals remain strictly located within a human-cen-
tric structure of meaning. In her study animals are present solely as a gesture to 
the repressed, external, inarticulable functions of language and subjectivity and 
never as presences in and of themselves.
 7 This image of weeding arises later in the text when, having had a sexual encoun-
ter with Bear, Lou, “for her sins, went to the garden and worked for an hour, 
painfully weeding” (94). Weeding implies a reordering of parts and an attempt 
to marginalize problematic components of a narrative in order to reconstruct 
a fragmented whole. Philips ironically transforms this metaphor, arguing that 
ecocritics “treat literary theory as if it were a noxious weed” (589).
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